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Abstract 
Whereas the supply of redistribution is relatively easy to measure, the determi-
nants of the demand for redistribution are controversially discussed in internation-
al literature. Economic theory typically models redistribution as the result of a 
voting mechanism; this is only inadequately reflected by the existing empirical 
studies. In general, these studies use survey data and are therefore not able to pre-
dict individuals’ decision making under the restriction of a budget constraint. This 
study aims at eliciting preferences for redistribution in Germany with the help of a 
Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), based on a representative sample of 1,538 in-
dividuals. A DCE solves the aforementioned problems by forcing individuals to 
overcome trade-offs. The results show a strong preference for redistribution that 
overshoots the current level. Considering socio-demographic characteristics, the 
results contradict the Meltzer-Richard-Model and the POUM hypothesis, while 
Piketty’s learning model is strongly supported by the data. 
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1. Motivation 
In Germany, as in most industrialized countries, income inequality has steadily increased (see 
OECD 2011a, 2011b). The government tries to affect the pre-tax income distribution by col-
lecting taxes and granting monetary transfers. By doing so, income inequality between pre-tax 
and net incomes is reduced by about 40 % on average in Germany as measured by the Gini-
coefficient (see Pfarr 2013, p. 3, SVR 2011, p. 338). This strong governmental involvement 
calls for a detailed analysis of redistributive policies. Whereas the supply of redistribution is 
relatively easy to measure, the determinants of the demand for redistribution are controver-
sially discussed in international literature. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004), most 
studies cover economic, institutional or behavioral factors. This study concentrates on the 
economic factors encompassing the traditional Meltzer-Richard hypothesis and the social mo-
bility hypothesis. 
In economic theory, redistribution is usually interpreted as the result of a voting mechanism. 
Individuals express their demand for redistribution in line with their preferences, and political 
parties act as the supplier thereof. Most of the existing literature concentrating on the deter-
minants for individuals’ redistributive preferences is not able to differentiate between these 
two sides. Moreover, as these studies use survey data, they cannot predict individuals’ deci-
sion making under the restrictions of their budget constraint.  
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the paper aims at eliciting preferences for re-
distribution in Germany with the help of a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), based on a 
representative sample of 1,538 individuals. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and the social mobil-
ity hypotheses are revisited. The unique dataset allows to solve the problems mentioned above 
as the respondents were forced to overcome trade-offs.3 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following paragraphs give a brief 
overview of the German redistributive system. Section 2 discusses the related theoretical and 
empirical literature and underlines the significance of the contribution. The following section 
focuses on the methodology applied with a short description of the implemented choice ex-
periment. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes and 
derives policy implications. 
The redistributive system in Germany can be roughly classified in redistribution on the bene-
fit side and on the funding side. Social benefits are granted with means testing (e.g. social 
                                                 
3 More information on the background of this research project as well as selected results (Pfarr 2012) can be 
found elsewhere. 
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welfare or housing subsidy), without means testing (e.g. child benefit) or as insurance benefit 
(e.g. unemployment insurance or health insurance) (see Pimpertz et al. 2009). These social 
benefits can be either direct monetary transfers or indirect monetary transfers, i.e. tax ex-
penditures. On the funding side, the progressive income tax implies an interpersonal redistri-
bution and goes along with earnings-related social security contributions. Taken together, the 
average personal tax and social contribution deduction is 30 % of the personal gross income 
(see Pfarr 2013, p. 140). A proxy for the extent of redistribution is the sum of social benefits 
in relation to the GDP. In Germany, this amounts to about 30 % in 2010, i.e. circa 760 billion 
euros (see BMAS 2011). This budget is financed by the contributions of employers and em-
ployees to the various social security schemes as well as tax subsidies. These subsidies 
amount to about 36 % of the total budget available for redistribution in 2010 (see BMAS 2011 
and Pfarr 2013, p. 27). Looking at the different groups of beneficiaries, 40 % of the social 
benefits are allotted to retirees and 35 % to the sick and to people in need of long-term care. 
The unemployed and families with children each account for about 10 %. Finally, about 5 % 
are dedicated to the working poor (see BMAS 2011 and Pfarr 2013, p. 23).  
Summarizing, redistribution in Germany is very high and motivated by the political agenda, 
i.e. reforms of the unemployment insurance, the statutory health insurance or the statutory 
pension insurance scheme (for example Boeckh et al. 2011). Over the past decades an abun-
dance of political interventions in the social security system which in part have serious conse-
quences for the nature and extent of redistribution. This raises the question of whether the 
current redistributive system is at all desired in this form. To be successful, political reforms 
of the welfare state have to be aligned with citizens’ preferences. Conversely, without a ma-
jority of supporters, reforms cannot be implemented. Thus, this paper could help to indicate 
where and how to achieve majorities. 
2. Related Literature  
2.1 The Meltzer-Richard and social mobility-hypothesis 
The best known economic model to describe individuals’ preferences for redistribution is the 
standard Meltzer-Richard-Model (MRM; Meltzer and Richard 1981) originally established by 
Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977). The MRM is based upon the intuitive idea that the current 
income position of an individual is decisive when voting for a future redistributive taxation. 
In the simplified framework of Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp. 118–121) utility maximizing 
individuals only differ with respect to their personal income and overall governmental activity 
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is limited to redistribution. Individuals are both economic agents and at the same time voters 
that have to vote on a redistributive proportional taxation and a lump-sum transfer.4 Given the 
model in Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 120), the optimal tax rate of individual i (τi) is given 
by 
(2.1) ( ) ( ) ,i i iττ α μ L τ   
with an individual’s personal pre-tax income αi and the mean income of the society μ. ( )iτL τ
represents the marginal costs of a higher tax rate and is always negative because of the nega-
tive consequences of a higher tax rate for the average labor supply ( )τL τ . The interpretation of 
(2.1) is straightforward: the lower the pre-tax income of individual i in relation to the average 
income, the higher is the preferred level of taxation and redistribution respectively. This result 
is intuitive as individuals with an income below the average income gain from an extended 
redistribution, i.e. they are net beneficiaries. Following Corneo and Grüner 2002 this voting 
behavior is called homo-oeconomicus-effect.5 As the focus is on individuals’ preferences, the 
following first hypothesis is derived from the MRM: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The lower the personal pre-tax income, the higher is the preferred tax rate 
 and redistribution respectively. 
One relevant drawback of the MRM is its assumption that elections are held continuously and 
individuals can thus react immediately to a changing income position.6 In reality, elections 
follow a predefined cycle which forces individuals not only to consider their current but also 
their future income position. This fact is reflected by the Prospects of Upward Mobility 
(POUM) hypothesis originally developed by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and formal-
ized by Benabou and Ok (2001). Alesina and Angeletos (2005, p. 900) propose a simplified 
two period nonlinear tax-benefit-system in which individuals are either tax payers or benefi-
ciaries dependent on a specific income threshold.7 A rational individual thus tries to maximize 
intertemporal net income which is determined by two factors: pre-tax income ( 1igy ) as well as 
either a payable tax deduction ( 1iψ ) or a granted benefit ( 1iυ ) in period one and expected fu-
                                                 
4 Moreover, individuals have quasi-linear preferences and the real wages as well as the price are normalized to 
one for the sake of simplicity. 
5 If it is assumed that median income is lower than the average income and that the median-voter is decisive, the 
inequality in the distribution of pre-tax incomes determines the amount of governmental redistribution. 
6 Clearly there exist further restrictions to the MRM such as the one-person-one-vote assumption. However these 
points refer to the macroeconomic perspective of the MRM and are not directly relevant for the analysis of indi-
viduals’ preferences for redistribution. For more information please refer to Borck and Rainald (2007), Breyer 
and Ursprung (1998) and Harms and Zink (2003). 
7 This model is based on the assumption that expected future income is an increasing function of current income 
(i.e. concave) and that individuals are bounded risk averse. In addition, the structure of the tax-benefit-system 
once decided by elections cannot be revised permanently. 
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ture pre-tax income ( 2( )igE y ) as well as either an expected payable tax deduction ( 2( )iE ψ ) or 
an expected granted benefit ( 2( )iE υ ) in period two. An individual will only opt for a redistrib-
utive tax-benefit-system if he expects to derive a positive utility from this system over both 
periods.8 As future is affected by uncertainty, individuals minimize the probability of being a 
tax payer. Thus, from the payout functions one obtains (see Alesina and Angeletos 2005, 
p. 902): 
(2.2) 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ip ψ υ E ψ E υ E ψ           
leading to the conclusion that individuals oppose redistribution if they expect to move up-
wards sufficiently in income and are currently poor. Taking both periods into account they 
will be net losers of this redistributive system. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: If an individual expects a higher future income, this individual demands 
 less redistribution. 
In contrast to the POUM hypothesis, which treats expectations about the future income posi-
tion as relevant factor for individuals’ preferences, Piketty (1995) adopts the original idea of 
the tunnel effect formulated by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and develops a rational 
learning model. This model describes how individuals assess their future opportunities. That 
is, varying attitudes towards redistribution can be attributed to diverging experiences in the 
past. Individuals who have experienced social upward mobility are convinced that personal 
effort will be rewarded and oppose extensive redistribution. According to this, expectations 
( )E   in equation (2.2) are dependent on the experiences in the past.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Individuals who have experienced upward mobility demand less  
 redistribution. 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
There is growing empirical literature regarding the determinants of individuals’ preferences 
for redistribution. Most of this literature uses survey data – such as the General Social Survey 
or the International Social Survey Program – to analyze individuals’ determinants for their 
preferences for redistribution. To uncover preferences for redistribution these studies usually 
draw on a question such as “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences 
in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. To what extent do 
you agree or disagree?” (for example Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 or Corneo and Grüner 
2000). In line with the theoretical section, the literature review is divided into two parts: em-
                                                 
8 This implies that a negative utility in one period can be compensated by a positive utility in another period. 
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pirical evidence regarding the MRM hypothesis (H 1) and regarding the social mobility hy-
potheses (H 2, H 3). 
First, referring to the MRM9, the proxies applied for an individual’s income position vary 
from personal gross or net income to household net income, education or personal self-
positioning on a social distance scale. A detailed overview of studies within this field can be 
found in table A.3 in the appendix. In the following a selection of some landmark articles is 
presented. A first and representative study is from Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) who use 
GSS-data for the US for the period 1978 to 1999. The authors provide supportive evidence 
regarding the MRM, i.e. with an increasing household net income or a higher education level 
the demand for redistribution is decreasing. Corneo and Grüner (2000; 2002) and Corneo 
(2001) refer to the ISSP of the year 1992 for several countries. Summarizing, individuals ex-
pecting to gain from redistribution tend to oppose an extensive welfare state. In addition, the 
difference between personal income and mean income of society strongly supports the under-
lying theory except for Germany for which no significance can be found. In contrast to the 
previous literature Guillaud (2012) chooses an alternative way to proxy individuals’ income 
position. With the help of data from the ISSP for the year 2006 he provides evidence that in-
dividuals who rate themselves in a higher social class show a considerably lower preference 
for redistribution than others. 
With respect to the social mobility hypotheses a distinction should be made between the 
POUM hypothesis (H 2) and Piketty’s learning model (H 3). Most of the existing studies do 
not differentiate between these two theories despite their different implications. Generally this 
can be explained by insufficient data containing either information about mobility expecta-
tions or mobility experiences. Whereas the POUM hypothesis is often modeled using an indi-
vidual’s expectation about his future income (social) position, proxies relating to Piketty’s 
learning model frequently use the individual’s past income (social) position.10 Table A.4 in 
the appendix provides detailed information on various studies covering the effects of social 
mobility, some of which are now presented in more detail. 
Starting with the POUM hypothesis, Rainer and Siedler (2008) find evidence – using data 
from the German SOEP for the year 2005 – that the expectation to receive a pay rise within 
                                                 
9 In contrast to studies with a microeconomic focus, contributions concentrating on the MRM on the macroeco-
nomic level aim at explaining the level of redistribution by economic inequality. Support for the MRM hypothe-
sis on the macro level can be found in Meltzer and Richard (1983), Kenworthy and McCall (2008) or Milanovic 
(2000) whereas Rodriguez (1999), Mello and Tiongson (2006) or Karabarbounis (2011) provide no evidence for 
the validity of this hypothesis. Thus the empirical literature is quite mixed. 
10 Furthermore, a comparison with regard to education, occupational prestige or standard of living between an 
individual and his father is often applied. 
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the next two years has a strong negative effect on the demand for redistribution. Another 
study of Fong (2006) using 1998 data of the Gallup Social Poll Audit for the US provides 
significant results that individuals expecting to move upwards in society exhibit less demand 
for redistribution. 
Guillaud (2012) uses individuals’ rating on a social distance scale but in contrast to Fong, 
oriented to the past to empirically test the implications of Piketty’s learning model. With data 
from the ISSP from the year 1999 he suggests that individuals who have experienced upward 
mobility tend to oppose redistribution whereas individuals who have moved downwards are in 
favor of an extensive welfare state. Kuhn (2012) applies data from the ISSP for the years 
1987, 1992 and 1999 to estimate the demand for redistribution in Germany. Respondents 
were first asked to estimate the wage earned in different professions and second to suggest 
what people working in these professions should earn. The difference between these two val-
ues was used to construct a measure for the demand for redistribution. According to Kuhn’s 
findings, German individuals prefer a more equal distribution of occupational wages than the 
perceived distribution if they have experienced upward mobility with respect to their social 
status. 
Summarizing the empirical literature reveals two main shortcomings. First, the lack of evi-
dence for Germany. Only few studies concentrating on Germans’ preferences for redistribu-
tion can be found. These studies use data from the year 2005 (see Rainer and Siedler 2008) or 
data from the year 1999 (see Corneo 2004 or Kuhn 2012). Since this data collection, the Ger-
man welfare state has been repeatedly reformed by far reaching political interventions such as 
the agenda 2010 (see BMAS 2009). This raises the question of whether the current redistribu-
tive system is in line with individuals’ preferences.  
The second shortcoming is methodological. In general, studies going beyond purely survey 
based measures of attitudes towards redistribution are extremely rare. Although redistribution 
is modeled as the result of a voting mechanism in economic theory, empirical analyses at the 
micro level do not account for this interaction. The adequacy of the questions used to elicit 
individuals’ preferences for redistribution typically applied in microeconometric studies is 
questioned (Fong 2006) as they are not able to predict individuals’ decision making under the 
restriction of their budget constraint. In addition they fail as they do not impose trade-offs. 
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Thus, the prediction of the demand for redistribution is distorted because individuals do not 
take into account the consequences of their decisions with respect to their own income.11 
With the exception of the studies of Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a; 2010b) and Neustadt 
(2011), no study measuring the preferences for redistribution using a DCE exists. The authors 
underline the applicability of a DCE to elicit citizens’ preferences. They find – among other 
results which will be discussed in detail in section 4 – that the average Swiss citizen has a 
preference for the current level of redistribution. In addition, their results are robust, highly 
significant and theoretically valid. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the paper aims at mitigating the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings by applying an advanced method and putting Germany in the spotlight. 
Preferences for redistribution in Germany are elicited for the first time with the help of a 
DCE, based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. This method allows individuals 
to be forced to overcome trade-offs as well as to account for the underlying voting mecha-
nism. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and social mobility hypotheses are revisited in line with 
the hypotheses developed in section 2.1 using this unique dataset. The results will contribute 
to the literature by giving new insights regarding preference heterogeneity with respect to 
economic self-interest and mobility. 
3. Methods  
3.1 Conceptional Framework 
To analyze preferences for redistribution data are needed which allow the analysis of prefer-
ences for goods that are not traded in real economic markets. The data must reflect decisions 
between alternative, hypothetical redistribution systems. This can be achieved by using stated 
preference (SP) data. SP data are especially suited for forecasting individuals’ decision mak-
ing by revealing existing but not articulated preferences (see Louviere and Street 2000, 
pp. 22–25). This concept is derived from traditional welfare economics and treats preferences 
as an attitude that can be made visible through choice experiments. A DCE is such a form of 
multi attribute valuation technique (see Bateman et al. 2002, p. 30). Louviere and Woodworth 
(1983) as well as Louviere and Hensher (1982) developed the DCE in its current form that is 
based on decision theory and in line with the microeconomic utility theory. DCEs were first 
                                                 
11 Boeri et al. ((2001); (2002)) stands out, as they try to overcome these problems using Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM). Their analyses focus on the attitudes towards redistribution with regard to pension and unem-
ployment schemes. Their approach allows the explicit inclusion of trade-offs between income and social insur-
ance coverage. One shortcoming of this approach is that it holds all attributes of the product “pension reform” 
constant, only varying its price. In contrast, a DCE is able to reflect trade-offs between all attributes. 
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applied in environment and transportation economics and since the middle of the 1990s also 
in health economics (see for example Bekker-Grob et al. 2012). 
A DCE is based upon a characteristics approach which has its theoretical underpinning in the 
new demand theory of Lancaster (1966). Lancaster suggests that individuals’ utility is not 
derived from goods per se. Instead, the new consumer approach assumes that individuals ben-
efit from the characteristics (or attributes) which goods have.12 In its special form, individuals 
taking part in a DCE take a discrete decision and choose only one option or good respectively. 
Each good is characterized through the relevant attributes as well as the desired attribute lev-
els that affect individuals’ utility (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 2). Thus, an individual i 
maximizes his utility over a combination of attributes z. As one good j can consist of various 
characteristics, the combination of the characteristics vector bj and the quantity indicator xj 
(attribute levels) results in zj, i.e. the bundle of characteristics of good j (Lancaster 1971, 
pp. 21–24). 
(3.1) ; 1, , .( ) ( , ) with zi i i j j j j nU u z u b x b x      
Moreover, the attributes differ with respect to their levels. By combining the attributes with 
their different levels one obtains new real or hypothetical alternatives. These alternatives con-
taining a set of distinct attribute levels are presented to each respondent within a choice exper-
iment. A utility maximizing individual will always choose the alternative with the highest 
utility. Thus, an individual will only choose alternative l if the utility derived from alternative 
l exceeds the utility derived from any other alternative j (see Ben-Akiva and Lermann 1985, 
p. 57; Louviere and Street 2000, p. 62). The utility function contingent upon this decision is: 
(3.2) ( ; ) max!ij i j jU u x b   
From the maximization of this utility function one obtains the conditional demand function xj 
of alternative j: 
(3.3) ( ; ; ; ).j j j i ix p b y s  
 
                                                 
12 The Lancastrian consumer approach is conform to neoclassic utility theory regarding the form and shape of the 
utility function. Thus, the axioms of transitivity, completeness, continuity and concavity also hold. The only 
difference to traditional neoclassic utility theory is its focus on characteristics rather than goods in general (Lan-
caster 1971, p. 20). 
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Together with eq. (3.2) this leads to the indirect (conditional) utility function of individual i, 
vi. 
(3.4) ( , , , ) ( , , , )  ,il ij l l l i i j j j i iV V v p b y s v p b y s j l      
The utility function consists of the price of the respective alternative pl, the attributes bl, indi-
viduals’ income yi and his socio-demographic characteristics si. Individuals’ choices are the 
result of a sequential decision making process while making binary comparisons between 
different alternatives and dealing with trade-offs (see Amaya-Amaya et al. 2008, p. 13). Fig-
ure 1 illustrates this choice behavior in the case of two attributes m and n.  
 
Figure 1: Choice situation and approximation of the indifference curve 
Source: Vroomen and Zweifel (2011, p. 89), own visualization. 
If a baseline alternative is included – i.e. typically the status quo S – a rational individual will 
only choose a proposed alternative B if this alternative offers a higher utility than the status 
quo. If at the same time the individual chooses status quo S rather than alternative A, the indi-
viduals’ indifference curve must be located between A and B (see Pfarr 2013, p. 112; 
Vroomen and Zweifel 2011, p. 89). In the course of the experiment, each respondent has to 
make repeated choices with varying alternatives, which allows the estimation of the individu-
al indifference curve. In this context, it is very important that the individual is driven to “jump 
back and forth” between the different alternatives indicating a higher or lower utility level 
(see Zweifel et al. 2010, p. 4). As the slope of the indifference curve is /m n  , the marginal 
rate of substitution ,n mMRS  between these two attributes can be easily computed. As the esti-
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m
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mated parameters of the indirect utility function reflect the marginal utilities of the respective 
attributes, the ,n mMRS  is given by (see Lancsar et al. 2007, p. 1741):13 
(3.5)      
ˆ( , , , )/ .ˆ( , , , )/
mm
n
n
l l l i i m bb
b l l l i i n b
v p b y s bMRS
v p b y s b

  
Furthermore, if nb  is substituted by the price attribute lp  the MRS can be interpreted as 
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP).14  
That is the MWTP of individual i for an additional unit of nb  expressed in units of individu-
als’ income. This measure of preferences will be applied in section 4. 
As individuals’ utility cannot be directly observed, utility is a latent construct. Thus, an error 
term ilε  is added to the indirect utility function of individual i, which is due to the fact that 
there are attributes or motives that cannot be observed but are nevertheless important for indi-
viduals’ decision making. According to the Random Utility Theory (see McFadden (1974; 
1981) and Manski (1977)) the utility function is stochastic and additively split in a determinis-
tic observable part ( )lw   and a stochastic component ilε : 
(3.6)       ( , , , ) ( , , , )  .il ij l l l i i il j j j i i ijV V w p b y s w p b y s j l   
Therefore, only the probability ilP  of individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can be 
estimated (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 53). 
This estimated probability indicates individuals’ decision making and corresponds to their 
demand for a given redistributive system expressed by choosing one of the proposed options. 
These options, i.e. status quo and one alternative, reflect the possible supply of redistribution. 
Thus, by means of this experiment, the voting mechanism is captured through the DCE. Fur-
thermore, with the incorporation of the price attribute pl which should indicate the personal 
contribution for a given redistributive system, the budget constraint is imposed. In this way, 
the experimental setting is able to reflect the underlying voting mechanism and to overcome 
the previously mentioned shortcomings.  
3.2 Implementation and Survey Design 
A DCE measures preferences over attributes in hypothetical decision situations. Therefore, an 
experimental design is required which incorporates the relevant attributes affecting individu-
als’ utility. The underlying experimental design was developed according to the procedure 
                                                 
13 In this case a linear utility function is assumed. If a nonlinear utility function is considered, the calculation is 
straightforward. 
14 The price parameter can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income with the help of Roy’s Identity. For 
formal proof see Hanemann (1983, p. 544) or Telser (2002, p. 56). 
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presented in Bateman et al. (2002, p. 258).The whole identification process included intensive 
literature reviews, expert interviews, and a focus group analysis covering a total of 629 stu-
dents as well as three independently conducted pretests involving about 40 persons each.15 At 
the end ten attributes are singled out. These are: personal tax and social contribution deduc-
tions16, the amount of redistribution as a percentage of the GDP, the socio-demographic status 
of beneficiaries (sick persons and persons in need of care, families with children, retirees, 
unemployed, working poor) as well as the nationality of recipients (German, West-European, 
Other) as relevant attributes. For visualization, these attributes are grouped together in four 
diagrams that make the substitutive character and the inherent trade-offs explicit.17  
Attribute Lable Level 
  Status quo  
Personal tax and social contribution deduction   
tax and contribution TC 15 %  25 % 30 %  35 % 45 % 
total amount of redistribution as percentage of GDP   
redistribution RE 20 %  25 % 30 %  35 % 45 % 
socio-demographic status of beneficiaries   
retirees RI   30 % 40 %  45 %  
sick persons and persons in need of care SP   30 % 35 %  40 %  
unemployed UL   5 % 10 %  15 %  
families with children FC   5 % 10 %  15 % 20 % 
working poor WP    5 %  10 %  
Nationality of recipients   
German DE 75 %  80 % 85 %  90 %  
West-European WE    5 %  10 %  
Other OT   5 % 10 %  15 %  
Table 1: Attributes, Labels and Levels 
Source: Own calculation. 
In a second step, the levels of the attributes were defined. They should be sufficiently wide to 
make respondents indeed “jump” between the status quo and an alternative redistributive 
scheme. Also, it should be possible to contrast an increase in the level of one attribute by a 
decline in the level of another attribute. That is, respondents should be forced to overcome 
trade-offs (cf. Bateman et al. 2002, p. 260; Telser 2002, p. 39). First, the levels of the status 
quo were defined. Following this, possible alternative levels for each attribute were assigned. 
To obtain meaningful results the attribute levels not only have to be plausible and realistic but 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion and presentation of the experimental design please refer to Pfarr (2012). 
16 To simplify, averages for the personal tax deductions are chosen. Furthermore, the progressivity of the Ger-
man income tax cannot be covered. That is, if personal income deductions would be individual specific – with 
respect to progression or amount of money – the econometric independency of attributes and individuals would 
fail. 
17 An example is provided in the appendix. 
 12 
also have to reflect the broad range of individuals’ preferences. Regarding the complexity, the 
number of chosen attribute levels should be limited. Table 1 represents the attributes and their 
respective levels. 
In the next steps, the design and the visual presentation of the DCE had to be considered. The 
complete factorial design – containing all possible combinations of attributes and their levels 
– results in a total of 129,600 combinations (alternatives) that cannot be realized in an exper-
iment. By using the program gosset to apply a D-optimal design (see Kanninen 2002, Kuhfeld 
et al. 1994, Kuhfeld 2006)18, the number of alternatives could be restricted to 49 and were 
split into seven groups.19 Each respondent is confronted with one of these groups (see fig-
ure 2). To control for errors in decision making, one alternative was included twice in each of 
the seven groups, resulting in 8 binary choices per respondent. 
 
Figure 2: Optimization procedure 
Source: own calculation. 
Further, for unbiased estimates it is necessary to ensure that all individuals have similar 
knowledge about the current status quo and that they have a clear understanding of the true 
state. Therefore, respondents are provided with detailed instructions and a description of the 
choice process as well as the attributes and their possible realizations.20 Finally, the choice 
                                                 
18 While the D-optimality was developed essentially for linear estimation models, Carson et al. (1994) suggest 
that the application for non-linear models such as probit or logit is also possible. 
19 Bech et al. (2011) shows that the cognitive burden increases in the number of choice sets. Nevertheless, expos-
ing respondents up to 17 choice-sets is manageable and respondents can handle it without problems. 
20 More information is available upon request.  
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experiment is complemented by a socio-demographic questionnaire covering the relevant in-
dividual characteristics to test the hypotheses developed in section 2. 
The choice experiment as well as the survey was conducted by computer assisted personal 
interviews in February 2012 with a total of 1,538 representatively selected individuals in 
Germany. 
3.3 Econometric specification 
During the course of the underlying choice experiment each respondent chooses between the 
status quo and an alternative redistributive scheme by maximizing his utility according to 
equation (3.6). In this context, only the probability ilP  of individual i choosing alternative l 
rather than j can be estimated. 
(3.7)  
 
    
         
   
( | ) Pr[ ( ) ( )]   l,j C ;  
                ( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( )
il
il m ij il l j m
ij il l l l i i j j j i i il il
P l C w w j l
w p b y s w p b y s d  
with il ij ilφ ε ε  .  
This probability is equal to the probability that differences between the error terms ( ij ilε ε ) 
are dominated by differences in the deterministic component ( ( ) ( )l jw w   ) (see Louviere and 
Street 2000, p. 40; Train 2009, p. 15). In line with the central limit theorem it can be assumed, 
that the error terms of eq. (3.7) are normally distributed with a mean vector of zero and covar-
iance matrix Ω (Cameron and Trivedi 2008, pp. 947–951; Train 2009, p. 97). Under these 
assumptions ϕ(⋅) denotes the pdf of a standard normal distribution, i.e. a binary probit 
model. Since each respondent makes 8 decisions, panel techniques should be applied. This 
results in a random effects probit model with its traditional assumptions regarding the mean, 
variance and correlation of the random effect and the conventional error term. 
The deterministic component of the utility function is typically modeled as an additive-linear 
specification (see Ben-Akiva and Lermann 1985, p. 63; Johnson and Desvousges 1997, p. 83), 
albeit its very restrictive implications of a constant marginal utility. Pekelman and Sen (1979) 
as well as Gegax and Stanley (1997) present evidence that a quadratic specification exceeds a 
linear form of the utility function with regard to the predictive power. Several specification 
tests and procedures (e.g. a Forward-Selection and Backward-Elimination procedure; Ramsey 
RESET test, Likelihood Ratio test) have pointed to the following model to be the best with 
respect to goodness of fit. As the two categories covering the types of beneficiaries add up to 
100 %, the attributes sick persons and persons in need of care and Germans were omitted to 
avoid perfect collinearity. The estimation equation includes a quadratic term for the attributes 
 14 
tax and contribution, redistribution, and other nationality therefore leading to a nonlinear 
indirect utility function. 
According to eq. (3.7), only utility differences in the deterministic component are relevant for 
an individual’s decision making. Therefore, individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics 
will drop out as they do not vary between the several decisions. To incorporate these factors 
and to allow testing of the hypothesis described in section 2, interactions of individuals invar-
iant characteristics with the varying attributes are needed (see Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, 
p. 421; Johnson and Desvousges 1997, p. 83). Thus, the estimation equation is as follows: 
(3.8) 
 
        
        
2 0
2 2
1 1
Pr [ 1| ]
[ ( * )] [ ( * )]
ilj i il m p pp
K K
k k k i kk i ilk k
k k
V decision C p p
b b s b b s 
  
      
0 0 0with ; .il ij il l jφ ε ε α α α     
In this equation, the δ’s reflect the parameters to be estimated, p stands for the price attribute, 
i.e. tax and contribution and bk is a vector of the remaining attributes. Individuals’ character-
istics are covered by the vector si. This vector will change dependent on the hypothesis and 
proxies applied. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
In February 2012, the survey was conducted by a market research institute with a total of 
1,538 respondents. The sample representatively reflects the German population that is eligible 
to vote regarding the criteria age, gender, family status, education and income position. Each 
respondent had to choose 8 times between the status quo and an alternative, resulting in a total 
of 1,538*8=12,304 decisions. Table 2 reflects the total number as well as the percentage of 
choices at the top of the table. According to this, about 34 % of the decisions were made in 
favor of an alternative. Obviously, the chosen attribute levels have caused the respondents to 
switch. A higher number of decisions for an alternative allow the approximation of the indif-
ference curve more accurately. Looking at the control questions, the test revealed that about 
13 % of the respondents were inconsistent in decision making. While the inconsistency is 
somewhat higher in a comparable DCE for Switzerland (14 %, Neustadt and Zweifel 2010a), 
the presented ratio is next to the lower limit of other studies, stating percentages from 9 % to 
39 % (Phillips et al. 2002). With a more detailed look at the number of chosen alternatives, 
only around 8 % of the individuals never chose an alternative (see the bottom of table 2). 
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choices  N    in % 
for status quo  8,084  65.70 
for alternative  4,220  34.30 
Total  12,304  100.00 
chosen alternatives # respondents in percent 
0  138  8.97 
1  234  15.21 
2  313  20.35 
3  382  24.84 
4  247  16.06 
5  142  9.23 
6  67  4.30 
7  6  0.39 
8  9  0.59 
Total  1,538  100.00 
Table 2 Choices and chosen alternatives per respondent 
Source: own calculation.  
An accumulation can be found for two (and three) chosen alternatives per respondent. That is, 
about 20 % (24 %) of the respondents were caused to leave the status quo two (three) times 
since from their point of view the respective alternatives offered a higher utility than the sta-
tus quo. 
For the empirical testing of the MRM (H 1), the existing literature uses various proxies (see 
section 2). As the aim is to analyze the MRM in its original form, individuals’ monthly gross 
income is used (GI). Moreover, as income is typically prone to missing values, a variable 
covering individuals’ self-positioning on a social distance scale (SC) is additionally tested.21 
In the sample, a proportion of about 11 % of individuals’ gross income is missing which is 
relatively small compared to similar national surveys (see Essig and Winter 2009). Table 3 
describes in detail how the variables are constructed.  
                                                 
21 In addition to these two variables, the effect of household net income as well as of individuals’ education is 
also controlled for. The results support the findings presented in the following section. These results are availa-
ble upon request. 
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Variable Description N Mean SD 
Gross Income (GI) 
GI I < 50 % of average gross income (1 – 1,050 €) 1,373 0.226 0.393
GI II 50 – 75 % of average gross income (1,051 – 1,570 €) 1,373 0.223 0.391
GI III 75 – 100 % of average gross income (1,571 – 2,100 €) 1,373 0.179 0.358
GI IV 100 – 125 % of average gross income (2,101 – 2,605 €) 1,373 0.113 0.294
GI V 125 – 150 % of average gross income (2,606 – 3,150 €) 1,373 0.101 0.279
GI VI 150 – 200 % of average gross income (3,151 – 4,200 €) 1,373 0.091 0.266
GI VII > 200 % of average gross income (> 4,201 €) 1,373 0.067 0.232
Social Class (SC) 
SC I Social class 1 (lowest class); categories 1-3 1,538 0.111 0.314
SC II Social class 2; category 4 1,538 0.104 0.305
SC III Social class 3; category 5 1,538 0.128 0.334
SC IV Social class 4; category 6 1,538 0.254 0.435
SC V Social class 5; category 7 1,538 0.203 0.403
SC VI Social class 6; category 8 1,538 0.152 0.359
SC VII Social class 7 (highest class); category 9,10 1,538 0.047 0.212
Data are weighted. 
Original question regarding SC: “In our society today there are groups which tend to be towards the top and 
groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale?” Respondents had to 
choose a position on a 10-point scale. 
Table 3: Variable construction and descriptive statistics 
Source: own calculation. 
GI is divided into seven binary income categories which represent the relative income posi-
tion of the individual to the mean (see Statistisches Bundesamt and Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung 2011, p. 164). Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the seven 
income categories. As GI I and GI II reflect the bottom of the income distribution, i.e. less 
than 75 % of mean income, the share of these two categories amounts to 45 %. In contrast, 
GI VII forms the top of the income distribution with more than 200 % of the mean. Variables 
GI III and GI IV are the middle categories with 75 % to 100 % and 100 % to 125 % respec-
tively.  
Just as the classification of GI, individual’s self-positioning is also clustered into seven cate-
gories (see table 3). SC I forms the lowest social class and SC VII represents individuals rat-
ing themselves into one of the two top social classes. This table clearly shows that the share of 
individuals rating themselves in the two bottom categories of social status is lower compared 
to the income categories. Furthermore, the correlation between GI and SC is very small. This 
implies that individuals are less likely to rate themselves in a social class according to their 
income position.  
To test the POUM-hypothesis (H 2), two specifications are used. First, an individual’s expec-
tation of his future income position (gross) and second, an individual’s assessment of his fu-
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ture social status. If individuals’ expected income or social status is higher than their present 
one, this is interpreted as upward mobility and vice versa. In cases in which the expected sta-
tus equals the current status, no mobility expectations are assumed. This strategy to cover 
mobility expectations can also be found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Fong (2006). 
Table 4 contains the relevant descriptive statistics. The number of observations is clearly low-
er compared to GI as about 24 % of the respondents reported neither their current nor their 
expected gross income. The share of individuals expecting upward income mobility is some-
what higher than those expecting a higher social status. Almost half of the respondents expect 
neither upward income nor social mobility. 
Variable Description N Mean SD 
Expected mobility in personal gross income 
Upward mobility Differences between expected gross income in 5 
years and current gross income is positive 
1,167 
 
0.343 
 
0.475
No mobility Differences between expected gross income in 5 
years and current gross income is zero 
1,167 
 
0.510 
 
0.500
Downward mobility Differences between expected gross income in 5 
years and current gross income is negative 
1,167 
 
0.147 
 
0.354
Expected mobility in social status 
Upward mobility Differences between expected social status in 10 
years and current social status is positive 
1,538 
 
0.254 
 
0.435
No mobility Differences between expected social status in 10 
years and current social status is positive 
1,538 
 
0.452 
 
0.498
Downward mobility Differences between expected social status in 10 
years and current social status is positive 
1,538 
 
0.294 
 
0.456
Data are weighted. 
Original question regarding income mobility: “What do you expect: How much will you earn in five years?” 
Original question regarding social mobility: “In our society today there are groups which tend to be towards the 
top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? Where would 
you put yourself in ten years?” Respondents had to choose a position on a 10-point scale. 
Table 4: Variable construction and descriptive statistics 
Source: own calculation. 
The proxies applied to investigate the effects of past mobility experiences (Piketty, H 3) are 
similar to the ones presented above. Individuals’ past income as well as social mobility is also 
taken into account. Individuals who stated a lower income or social status five (ten) years ago 
are assumed to have upward mobility experiences and vice versa. The descriptive statistics for 
these two groups of variables is provided in table 5. About 42 % of the respondents have ex-
perienced upward income mobility whereas only about 32 % have experienced that their so-
cial status has improved. The majority of German citizens report having experienced neither 
upward nor downward income mobility or social mobility within the last ten years. Thus, the 
figure for experienced mobility is about the same as for expected mobility. The proportion of 
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missing values for experienced mobility in personal income is somewhat lower compared to 
GI. Obviously, more respondents were able to report their gross income five years ago than 
their expected gross income. 
Variable Description N Mean SD 
Experienced mobility in personal gross income 
Upward mobility Differences between current gross income and 
gross income 5 years ago is positive 
1,226 
 
0.420 
 
0.494
No mobility Differences between current gross income and 
gross income 5 years ago is zero 
1,226 
 
0.342 
 
0.475
Downward mobility Differences between current gross income and 
gross income 5 years ago is negative 
1,226 
 
0.238 
 
0.426
Experienced mobility in social status 
Upward mobility Differences between current social status and so-
cial status 10 years ago is positive 
1,538 
 
0.319 
 
0.466
No mobility Differences between current social status and so-
cial status 10 years ago is zero 
1,538 
 
0.349 
 
0.477
Downward mobility Differences between current social status and so-
cial status 10 years ago is negative 
1,538 
 
0.332 
 
0.471
Data are weighted. 
Original question regarding income mobility: “How much did you earn five years ago?” 
Original question regarding social mobility: “In our society today there are groups which tend to be towards the 
top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? Where would 
you have put yourself ten years ago?” Respondents had to choose a position on a 10-point scale. 
Table 5: Variable construction and descriptive statistics 
Source: own calculation. 
4.2 Meltzer-Richard-Hypothesis 
Each dummy variable covering a single income category (GI I to GI VII) has to be interacted 
with the two attributes of interest, i.e. RE (redistribution) and TC (tax and contribution) as 
well as with their quadratic terms to define the socio-demographic characteristics alternative 
specific (as described in section 3.3). Only then, statements about whether individuals within 
the bottom income category exhibit a higher or lower preference for redistribution than indi-
viduals in another category can be made. Representatively for the subsequent procedure, the 
approach applied for the first income category GI I is discussed. 
In a first step, the full model (eq. (3.8)) is estimated as random effects probit model. Second, 
partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to the attributes RE and TC have 
to be calculated in order to generate the MWTP. Within the course of the experiment, re-
spondents are confronted with a comparison of the status quo and an alternative redistributive 
system. To simplify the interpretation, MWTPs are calculated based on the status quo, i.e. for 
example if the level of RE in the alternative and the level of RE in the status quo are exactly 
the same ( 0RE  ). Thus, the quadratic terms of RE and TC drop out of the equation.  
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(3.9) 
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For all individuals of the category GI I, all other dummy income variables are zero as each 
individual can only assign one income category. Finally, the MWTP for an increase in the 
amount of redistribution for individuals of income category GI I results from the coefficients 
of RE and TC as well as an income specific correction factor ( ˆ ;GI I_RE GI I_TC  ). In the case 
of GI I, equation (3.9) shows, that both RE and TC are reduced by a negative income specific 
factor resulting in a MWTP of 0.672 percentage points of individuals’ monthly gross income. 
The interpretation is as follows: Individuals within the lowest income category GI I are will-
ing to pay 0.672 percentage points of their monthly gross income per additional percentage 
point of redistribution in excess of the status quo. The MWTP values for the other categories 
are computed in the same way. 
The variance for each MWTP is computed with the help of the delta-method (see Hole 2007) 
as the numerator as well as the denominator is a random variable. Apart from the level of sig-
nificance of each MWTP it is important that the MWTPs differ significantly from each other, 
i.e. heterogeneous preferences can be observed. The full estimation results for GI and SC are 
provided in the appendix. Figure 3 shows only significant differences between MWTP values 
for both proxies of individuals’ income position. 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a decreasing preference for redistribution as income increases. This 
means that the MWTP should decrease the higher the income category. However, as is clear 
from figure 3 (and table A.1), there is no monotonic trend within the MWTP values. First, 
MWTP for redistribution is significantly higher for individuals within income category GI I, 
i.e. individuals with income less than 50 percent of mean income, compared to individuals of 
category GI III (75 to 100 percent of mean income). That is, preference for governmental re-
distribution decreases the closer individuals’ income is to the mean. In contrast to the theoret-
ical implications, preference for redistribution is increasing rather than decreasing for individ-
uals with income above the mean. Furthermore, the top income category offers the highest 
MWTP in absolute terms. This result contradicts hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 3: Current income position and preferences for redistribution 
Source: own calculations. 
A study applying a similar approach for Switzerland questions the validity of the MRM, too. 
Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) find that individuals within the lowest income category exhibit 
the lowest MWTP for redistribution. 
The results for the second proxy applied (SC) show a similar pattern. MWTP is first decreas-
ing the closer to the mean and is increasing the more individuals’ social status exceeds the 
mean. Hence, individuals grouping themselves in a lower social category have a higher pref-
erence for redistribution than individuals belonging to the middle class. Neustadt and Zweifel 
(2010a) show that Swiss citizens of the highest social class state the highest MWTP. In this 
case these findings support the results presented in this paper.22 
Summarizing, the empirical evidence presented in part contradicts the underlying theory. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected. Initially, preference for redistribution is decreasing 
with increasing income as expected. The more individuals’ income or social status exceeds 
the mean, preference for redistribution is once again increasing rather than decreasing. Subse-
                                                 
22 Among the classification presented in the paper, other specifications of the income or social categories are 
tested. All of these estimates strongly support the results presented. 
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quently, the motives that are driving these decisions have to be discussed. The behavior of 
individuals below the mean is intuitive and as predicted from the economic model. The mo-
tives of individuals above the mean cannot be interpreted as economic self-interest. In con-
trast this points to more behavioral factors such as fairness, reciprocity and a “belief in a just 
world” (see for example Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006 or Fong 
2001). Especially in societies that do not offer every member the same chances, a stronger 
preference for redistribution can be observed. On the other hand, as suggested from the 
POUM hypothesis, expectations about the future income position may be relevant for indi-
vidual’s preferences for redistribution. 
4.3 Social Mobility 
For the following analysis, the assumption that elections are held permanently and individuals 
can thus react immediately to a changing income position is relaxed. Now, elections follow a 
predefined cycle which forces individuals not only to consider their current but also their fu-
ture income position. While the POUM hypothesis concentrates on individuals’ expectations, 
the implications from Piketty’s learning model point to experiences as relevant factors. First, 
results regarding the POUM hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) are presented. 
The empirical procedure is analogue to the one adopted for the MRM hypothesis. Table 6 
shows the result for expected future income mobility. Individuals expecting upward income 
mobility exhibit significantly lower support for governmental redistribution (MWTP 0.483) 
than individuals expecting no mobility at all (MWTP 0.618). However, this result is only sta-
tistically significant at the 10 % level. No significant differences can be found between indi-
viduals with no and downward mobility expectations. 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP upward mobility no mobility downward mobility
upward mobility 0.483***  *  
no mobility 0.618*** *   
downward mobility 0.539***    
N 9,336      
LL 5,354      
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Table 6: Expected future mobility in income and preferences for redistribution 
Source: own calculations. 
Expected upward mobility therefore reduces individuals’ preferences for redistribution. This 
result is in line with Hypothesis 2. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) present results in contradic-
tion to the POUM hypothesis. Swiss citizens expecting no future upward or downward mobil-
ity in income are the least willing to pay for redistribution. 
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Referring to expected self-positioning on a social distance scale, table 7 displays highly sig-
nificant MWTP values. The levels of the MWTP are very similar in absolute terms, but do not 
differ significantly from each other. Therefore, no clear statements could be made with re-
spect to expected social upward and downward mobility. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) pre-
sent evidence for expected social mobility that corresponds to the findings for expected in-
come mobility. 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP upward mobility no mobility downward mobility
upward mobility 0.572***    
no mobility 0.592***    
downward mobility 0.512***    
N 12,304      
LL 7,063      
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Table 7: Expected future mobility in social status and preferences for redistribution 
Source: own calculations. 
Summarizing, the empirical evidence only weakly supports the POUM hypothesis for Germa-
ny. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. German citizens expecting increasing in-
comes are supposedly less supportive of the welfare state. This result is in line with the exist-
ing literature that confirms a negative effect of expected upward mobility on preferences for 
redistribution. 
In contrast to the POUM hypothesis, Piketty’s learning model concentrates on mobility in the 
past. Hence, experienced upward mobility dampens individuals’ support for redistribution. 
According to the specifications above, two proxies are applied to investigate the effects of 
Piketty’s learning model for German citizens: past mobility in income (table 8) and past mo-
bility in social status (table 9). 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP upward mobility no mobility downward mobility
upward mobility 0.463***  ** ** 
no mobility 0.636*** **   
downward mobility 0.686*** **   
N 9,808      
LL 5,608      
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Table 8: Past mobility in income and preferences for redistribution 
Source: own calculations. 
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The results in table 8 confirm the implications of Piketty. MWTP is significantly lower 
(0.463) for those whose gross income is currently higher than five years ago, i.e. experienced 
upward mobility, compared to individuals who experienced no or downward mobility (0.636 
and 0.686 respectively). Thus, positive mobility experiences in the past have a negative im-
pact on preferences for redistribution. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) reject the learning model 
hypothesis as Swiss citizens with no income mobility in the past exhibit the lowest MWTP. 
Finally, past mobility in social status is considered. Individuals stating upward social mobility 
in the past have considerably lower preferences for redistribution than individuals who have 
experienced no or downward mobility. In this respect, these results correspond to the findings 
for past income mobility implying the validity of Hypothesis 3 for Germany. 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP upward mobility no mobility downward mobility
upward mobility 0.440***  ** *** 
no mobility 0.624*** **   
downward mobility 0.638*** ***   
N 12,304      
LL 7,063      
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Table 9: Past mobility in social status and preferences for redistribution 
Source: own calculations. 
The results are in line with the international empirical literature and extend the existing evi-
dence presented for the MRM insofar as individuals do not only take their current income into 
account if they are voting for redistribution. Instead, experiences are relevant for projections 
about the future as suggested by the learning model of Piketty. It also seems plausible that 
positive upward mobility experiences are associated with the attitude that personal efforts are 
rewarded within a society. According to this, individuals who are not working hard enough 
might benefit from an extended redistributive system. This interpretation leads directly to 
more behavioral factors which are closely related to Piketty’s learning model. Especially col-
lective beliefs seem to be important for individual’s preferences for redistribution and require 
further research. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study focuses on the determinants of individuals’ preferences for redistribution. In detail, 
traditional economic theory suggests that individuals’ income position as well as expected and 
experienced mobility may be relevant for individuals’ decisions concerning the extent of the 
welfare state. In contrast to the existing literature, this contribution chooses an advanced 
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methodology which allows the use of individuals’ decisions under the restrictions of their 
budget constraint. Thereby it is possible to predict individuals’ preferences and therefore the 
voting behavior more realistically. As a result, the contribution of this study is twofold. First, 
the paper aims at eliciting preferences for redistribution in Germany with the help of a DCE, 
based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and the 
social mobility hypotheses are revisited. The unique dataset allows the solving of the prob-
lems mentioned above as the respondents were forced to overcome trade-offs. In addition the 
methodology applied is able to reflect the underlying voting mechanism of redistribution. 
The results provided in this paper are quite mixed. The Melter-Richard-Model finds no sup-
port from the data for Germany. In contrast to the theoretical implications, individuals’ pref-
erences for redistribution are increasing rather than decreasing the higher their personal in-
come. This suggests that individuals’ attitudes are not purely economic self-interest. Moreo-
ver, the empirical evidence substantiates the theoretical predictions of Piketty’s learning mod-
el. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that individuals who have experienced upward 
mobility in the past exhibit less supportive preferences for redistribution. Thus, while Hy-
pothesis 1 must be rejected, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. 
The adequacy of the proposed DCE is contingent upon two aspects: First, the extent to which 
hypothetical decisions are able to approximate real decisions. Second, whether the respond-
ents were able to deal with the decision situation, understand the experiment and finally re-
veal their true preferences. These aspects must be discussed and analyzed critically. However, 
the comparable study of Neustadt and Zweifel 2010a as well as continuative analyses of the 
validity of the underlying DCE strongly suggest that this experiment is free from distortions 
and is able to reliably measure the preferences of German citizens for redistribution. 
Concluding, economic factors might only explain parts of individuals’ preferences. Particular-
ly the impact of behavioral factors must be investigated prospectively. The underlying dataset 
also offers this opportunity. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Empirical Results for GI 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP GI I GI II GI III GI IV GI V GI VI GI VII 
GI  I 0.672***   *    * 
GI  II 0.575***       ** 
GI  III 0.450*** *      *** 
GI  IV 0.581***       ** 
GI  V 0.480***       *** 
GI  VI 0.483***       *** 
GI  VII 0.956*** * ** *** ** *** **  
N 10,984        
LL 6,286        
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
Table A.2: Empirical Results for SC 
 redistribution Test for heterogeneity 
 MWTP SC I SC II SC III SC IV SC V SC VI SC VII 
SC  I 0.709***     ***   
SC  II 0.851***   * ** *** **  
SC  III 0.607***  *   ***   
SC  IV 0.556***  **   **   
SC  V 0.320*** *** *** *** **  ** ** 
SC  VI 0.531***  **   **   
SC  VII 0.742***     **   
N 12,304        
LL 7,037        
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors were calculated with the help of the delta-method. 
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Table A.3: A selection of empirical studies regarding the effects of individuals’ income  
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Table A.4 continued 
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